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Abstract 
We start with the distinction of outcome- and belief-based 
Bayesian models of the sequential update of agents’ beliefs 
and subjective reliability of sources (trust). We then focus on 
discussing the influential Bayesian model of belief-based trust 
update by Eric Olsson, which models dichotomic events and 
explicitly represents anti-reliability. After sketching some 
disastrous recent results for this perhaps most promising 
model of belief update, we show new simulation results for 
the temporal dynamics of learning belief with and without 
trust update and with and without communication. The results 
seem to shed at least a somewhat more positive light on the 
communicating-and-trust-updating agents. This may be a light 
at the end of the tunnel of belief-based models of trust 
updating, but the interpretation of the clear findings is much 
less clear.  
Keywords: belief-based updating; epistemic trust; source 
reliability; Bayesian model; communication; social cognition; 
network analysis, agent-based modelling, polarization 
Introduction 
Socially available information is an indispensable source of 
knowledge, from expert judgment to witness testimony. 
However, learning from partially reliable sources is fraught 
with problems. In particular, it is difficult to simultaneously 
update a belief in a proposition of interest and the reliability 
of a particular source providing pieces of evidence. Lacking 
certainty on either component, epistemic agents have to face 
such scenarios frequently. We focus on simple dichotomic 
hypotheses (H = 0 or H = 1), partial reliable evidence, and 
Bayesian agents when discussing the issue of the dynamics 
of sequential belief-based updating.  
Outcome-based vs. belief-based strategies of 
updating epistemic trust 
As an introduction we first clarify our distinction of 
outcome-based and belief-based strategies of trust updating 
(mentioned in Hahn, von Sydow, Merdes, 2018). Although 
our main concern is with belief-based strategies, we will 
here sketch outcome-based strategies in slightly more detail 
and discuss a potential problem.   
Outcome-based strategies A rather unproblematic 
method for updating epistemic trust seems to be outcome-
based strategies, using observed frequencies of the co-
occurrence of (apparent) evidence and ultimate outcomes. In 
such situations, the standard tools of frequentism or 
Bayesian inference seem applicable to represent rational 
degrees of reliability or ‘epistemic trust’. Such strategies, 
however, assume that (all) agents can look behind the veil of 
phenomena (the evidence) and – at some point – have 
access to the truth (at least pragmatically, even if the thing-
in-itself may never be known).  
It seems, for instance, that we can come to judge quite 
accurately the reliability1 of medical tests, such as a 
pregnancy test, only if we can square instances of test 
prediction with the eventual outcomes. 
Technically, one needs an estimate for the originally 
unknown likelihood that the evidence of the test is positive 
(D1=‘pregnant’), given the hypothesis is true (H1 = truly 
pregnant), P(D1|H1) = P(‘pregnant’ | pregnant). This is the 
true positive rate, also called the sensitivity of a test. For a 
dichotomic outcome (with H2 = not pregnant) it follows that 
P(D1|H1) = 1 – P(D2|H1). Likewise one can infer the true 
negative rate, also called ‘specificity’ P(D2|H2) = P(‘not 
pregnant’ | not pregnant). More directly, one can obtain 
evidence for the positive predictive value, 
P(pregnant|‘pregnant’), and negative predictive value, P(not 
pregnant|‘not pregnant’). Let us assume for simplicity’s 
sake that the reliability of the test remains stable over time. 
One possibility for assessing these conditional probabilities 
is the frequentist approach of counting the positive relative 
to all instances. Another possibility for assessing rational 
expected conditional probabilities and conditional 
probability distributions over a parameter Theta is a 
Bayesian, using priors, Bayes rule, conditionalization and a 
Beta-binomial updating (von Sydow, 2016).  
Note, however, that any such outcome-based approach, 
although providing rational trust values, already assumes, 
by definition, 100% reliable final outcomes. On the other 
hand it excludes basing reliability estimates on one’s beliefs 
and is strictly speaking not applicable if this 100% 
reliability is not ensured. Philosophically one may therefore 
argue that this involves a regress, even ad infinitum: how is 
our 100% trust in the final observation justified? One 
possibility is linked to a respectable tradition in philosophy 
advocating distinctions such as theoretical vocabulary vs. 
observational vocabulary, knowledge by descriptions vs. 
knowledge by acquaintance, or ‘seeing as’ vs. ‘seeing that’. 
                                                          
1 Reliability in our debate is defined as conditional probability or 
likelihood. For instance, the generative objective reliability is the 
conditional probability P(Test H=1|Truth H=1), which is set equal 
to P(Test H=0|Truth H=0), according to which the data is sampled. 
Note that this notion of reliability differs from other notions used 
in diagnostics (such as re-test reliability).  
 
However, first, these distinctions and the ‘Myth of the 
Given’ (Sellars, 1956) have been challenged by 
philosophers and psychologists of perception, suggesting 
that observations on some level may be illusory, contextual 
or theory-laden. Second, even if one accepts such 
distinctions, one may counter that this is not helpful here: 
Even if one assumes basic, reliable sense data, this does not 
ensure that the ‘observations’ we are interested in here are 
100% reliable. One cannot directly ‘observe’ that one is/was 
pregnant, but only a belly or later, a baby born. Our 
contextual knowledge plays a role to interpreting such 
‘observations’. It seems even questionable whether in 
principle one is ever entitled to be 100% sure (on contingent 
matters), particularly if one is a Bayesian. Another 
possibility might be that there are knowledge-based, 
theoretical or contextual justifications for assigning very 
high trust in observations (perhaps even involving inductive 
virtuous circles; von Sydow, 2006).  
However, at least from a more pragmatic viewpoint, our 
distinction seems to make sense, since there is an obvious 
difference between a test whose reliability is not known, and 
a later obtained outcome that – by common standards – can 
be known. Nonetheless, we thought it is also adequate to 
raise the question whether our dichotomic distinction of 
outcome-based and belief-based trust updating has its 
problems and is, perhaps, too simplistic. 
Belief-based strategies Even if there are clear cut 
outcome-based situations, many actual situations seem to 
involve and require belief-based strategies of trust updating. 
For instance, in the contexts of communication, reading, 
witness reports (and perhaps even measurement) we often 
obtain reports that are only partially reliable, without 
ourselves being able to assess their ultimate truth. In a 
belief-based strategy of trust-update, an agent nonetheless 
uses this evidence and revises not just her beliefs, but also 
the reliability of the respective source based on the match 
between evidence and current belief (Olsson, 2011, 2013; 
Bovens & Hartmann, 2003). For instance, if you tell me 
that the Earth is flat, this will make me think this is slightly 
more likely to be true, but it will also make me consider you 
less reliable than I had previously thought. (Incidentally, in 
a curved space the earth can in fact be considered flat.) Such 
a strategy seems intuitive, and there is empirical evidence 
supporting its use (Collins, Hahn, von Gerber, & Olsson, 
2018). 
Olsson’s Bayesian model of  
belief-based trust-update 
We here concentrate on an influential Bayesian model of 
belief-based trust-update formulated by Eric Olsson (2011, 
2013). It explicitly represents anti-reliability (see also 
Bovens & Hartmann, 2003, for an interesting alternative, cf. 
Merdes et al., subm.). 
The model incorporates various parameters, such as a 
threshold for full belief, a probability of communication if 
this threshold is passed, etc. However, the following two 
equations are central. The first specifies the Bayesian update 
of the belief (credence or subjective probability) about a 
dichotomic hypothesis according to 
 
𝑃𝑡+1(ℎ) = 𝑃𝑡(ℎ|𝑒) = 𝐸[𝜏𝑡] ∗ 𝑃𝑡(ℎ)𝐸[𝜏𝑡] ∗ 𝑃𝑡(ℎ) + (1 − 𝐸[𝜏𝑡]) ∗ �1 − 𝑃𝑡(ℎ)� 
 
where E[tau] is subjective reliability, formalized as 
expected value of a reliability distribution. The reliability 
distribution is updated by: 
  
𝜏𝑡+1(𝑥) = 𝜏(𝑥|𝑒) = 𝑥 ∗ 𝑃𝑡(ℎ) + (1 − 𝑥) ∗ �1 − 𝑃𝑡(ℎ)�𝐸[𝜏𝑡] ∗ 𝑃𝑡(ℎ) + (1 − 𝐸[𝜏𝑡]) ∗ �1 − 𝑃𝑡(ℎ)� 𝜏𝑡(𝑥) 
 
Although various priors can be used, for the purpose of 
this paper a natural beta distribution is used, which is the 
conjugate standard distribution for binomial events.  
Previous Results - A disaster 
 
Figure 1: Mean (in)accuracy (squared error) of agent’s 
belief averaged over 1000 runs for each objective likelihood 
and base rate of H being true. The graph is collapsed over 
base rates, since they had no influence here. Each run 
involved 10 pieces of evidence. The lines compare trust 
updater and fixed-trust agent and set them against the 
accuracy-score of an optimal agent who knows the true 
likelihood (from Hahn et al., 2018). 
 
For several reasons, one may argue that although this 
model uses Bayes theorem it is concerned with naive 
Bayesian agents only (and not necessarily optimal 
Bayesians). This is linked to issues of independence of 
sources and using the model sequentially (Hahn et al.,  
2018; Merdes et al., subm.). We nonetheless treat it as a 
possibly reasonable “Bayesian heuristics” whose normative 
merits must be explored empirically.   
Recent simulations (Hahn et al., 2018; Hahn et al., 2019, 
subm.; Merdes et al., subm.) showed some disastrous 
results, calling into doubt that belief-based updating of 
source epistemic trust is a normative, optimal or even good 
strategy. 
Hahn et al. (2018) investigated the Olsson model, looking 
at effects of trust-update on individual isolated agents. The 
Olsson model indeed also involves updating the reliability 
of data sources. Due to the feedback circle between belief 
and trust in successive updating (and in the network context 
also due to potential dependencies between communication-
sources), learning is order-dependent. Based on agent-based 
modelling and simulations comparing trust-updating with 
fixed-trust agents, Figure 1 presents one comparison of 
them. The graph shows the inadequacy of the agent’s belief. 
In the simulations the isolated agents began with a particular 
subjective reliability or trust (psub=.66), facing different 
objective reliabilities pobj. The results show not only that the 
trust-updating (despite formally representing anti-reliability) 
clearly does not solve the problem of anti-reliable data (or 
the ‘problem of a Cartesian Demon’), but it also shows that 
trust-updaters and fixed-trust agents behave quite similarly 
even with a disadvantage to the average beliefs when pobj >> 
.5 (actually for absolute differences for pobj > .5). 
Surprisingly, updaters here fare even worse than fixed-trust 
agents. 
In further simulations without networks of updating or 
fixed-trust agents, similar results have been found (Hahn et 
al.,subm.; cf. also Hahn et al., 2018b).  
Light at the end of the tunnel? 
Before proceeding to our new result, we briefly wish to 
point out another finding that could be interpreted somewhat 
more positively for belief-based updating. 
Prior knowledge 
 
Trust-updating Agent 
 
 
Fixed-trust Agent 
 
Figure 2: Mean (in)adequacy (the squared difference 
between beliefs and the actual status of hypothesis H (false 
= 0, true = 1) for either trust-updating or fixed-trust agents. 
The agents had prior knowledge of Prior = Base rates (from 
Hahn et al.,2018, and one panel of Fig. 6) 
 
A further result of our previous simulations (Hahn et al, 
2008) is that if the agents were endowed with some prior 
knowledge, this led to somewhat better results. It has also 
claimed more generally, with reference to the fundamental 
problem of induction, that induction, perhaps paradoxically, 
always requires to be a knowledge-based endeavour (von 
Sydow, 2006). However, Figure 2 shows the (in)adequacy 
of the final individual average beliefs for trust-updating and 
fixed-trust agents given some prior knowledge (prior = base 
rates). We cannot discuss the results in detail here, but it is 
apparent that for huge areas of the parameter space the error 
(high regions in the landscape plot) remains high with  both 
strategies. However, the updater here turned out somewhat 
better, with an advantage relative to the fixed-trust agent. 
Additionally, an adequacy-improvement was found with 
regard to the trust-values themselves. Although the results 
for the updater are not good enough to elicit enthusiasm, 
they suggest advantages in situations with prior knowledge. 
Future work has to show whether trust-updating may have 
enhancing effects when, for instance in more complex belief 
networks, belief-based updating is mixed with fixed-trust 
updating.   
Dynamics – our new contribution 
 
Figure 3: Belief in true hypothesis over 50 modeling steps 
of two agents in a run with objective reliability p = .66 
 
In the remainder of this paper we focus on presenting our 
new results on the temporal dynamics. We investigate 
advantages and disadvantages of communicating vs. non-
communicating agents and belief-based updating vs. fixed-
trust agents over time. In this presentation we concentrate 
on exemplary parameter values.2 Given these values, the 
                                                          
2 For simplicity and reduction of free parameters, we follow 
Olsson, using symmetric objective and subjective likelihood (= 
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chart panels presented begin with looking at quite specific 
examples, to more general findings. Crucially, the 
hypothesis here is always set to be true (H=1, and Pobj(H) = 
1). We show belief plots only, but they can be interpreted as 
adequacy plots, given that the differences from one 
represent absolute (not squared) inadequacy.  
 Figure 3 provides a first impression of how belief is 
updated over 50 rounds for two random agents out of a 
random run with 50 agents. The agents are either 
communicating (‘network’ agents) or shadow agents. They 
either have a fixed subjective reliability/likelihood (= trust) 
or are belief-based updates of trust. It is apparent that the 
fixed-trust agents only ‘move’ through specific belief levels. 
This follows from the fixed (and symmetric) likelihood 
function, and it corresponds to the fact that here, without 
belief-based trust updating, learning is not order-dependent. 
Obtaining first evidence E (favouring H) and then ¬E 
(favouring ¬H) leads back to the identical belief level, and 
these plateaus of belief should not change even after time.3 
                                                                                                  
reliability) functions with P(H|E) = P(¬H|¬E). Further used para-
meters were belief prior, Psub_bel(H) = .5; trust prior, Psub_rel(Sour-
ces) = .66 (for fixed trust and, for the updater, a Beta 2 1 distri-
bution); threshold of assertation = 0.8; probability of communica-
tion = .25; and probability of occurrence data = .1. The topology 
was a standard small world network (50 agents, 2 neighbours, 
rewiring probability of .2). We simulated 50 steps of updating. We 
also used a high integration resolution (1000) and an improved 
algorithm (which did not seem to matter very much). 
3 This seems to follow from a standard Bayesian updating. How-
ever, one might consider extending the Olsson model formalizing 
belief also as a second-order probability distribution over probabi-
In contrast, trust-updating agents do not get back to their 
previous plateaus. If we compare network and shadow 
agents, who actually received identical data from the world 
but either communicated or not, the non-communicating 
agents seem less decided. Some examples here have by 
chance actually partly obtained more evidence counter to 
rather than in favour of the hypothesis. In contrast, for the 
communicating agents, the evidence obtained from other 
agents helped develop a resolved belief in the true 
hypothesis H. 
Although the results of Figure 3 are helpful for a first 
impression, Figure 4 generalizes them in showing results for 
all 50 agents of a run (gray lines) and all four investigated 
kinds of updating in single graphs. Additionally, the red 
lines show the means, and the black lines the variances 
between agents. The three examples suggest the following: 
The shadow fixed-trust updating for low reliability (p = .66) 
leads to beliefs with great variance. The updating fixed-trust 
agent’s belief shows an even larger between-agent variation, 
presumably due to self-enforcing dynamics of belief-based 
updating. Communication here clearly seems to improve the 
situation by amplifying individual’s over-weak signals. 
Here the variance often diminishes, although not in all 
examples. The network updating strategy in fact brings back 
agents starting with a dynamic in the wrong direction (Run 
101), but it also seems to show partial (Run 102) or 
complete and stable polarization within a run (Run 103). 
                                                                                                  
lities (e.g., using a Beta distribution). Then (without a kind of for-
getting function) updating movements would diminish with the 
accumulation of data. 
 
Figure 4: Three examples (three runs) of belief dynamics of a network for an objective reliability of .66 of the four kinds 
of updaters (Network Updater, Network Shadow, Fixed-Trust Agent, Fixed-Trust Shadow). Each graph shows the belief 
change of the 50 agents in the network (each is represented by a gray line), a red line shows mean beliefs and a black line 
the variance of agents’ beliefs. The evidence is matched only for pairs of network and shadow agents (e.g. for Updaters).   
 
To test the generality of these results, we simulated 100 
model runs over 50 steps with these 50 agents—once with 
the updaters and once with the fixed trust agents (resulting 
in 500,000 agent data sets). Figure 4 gives the results. The 
red lines again show the mean beliefs of each run, now with 
50 such lines in a graph. Additionally, their mean (the run’s 
mean of mean agent’s beliefs) is shown in purple. Figure 4 
provides more general results for the reliabilities p = .33, 
.66, .80, and .90 (involving 2,000,000 agent results). It is 
apparent that the mean beliefs shown in Figure 5 for p = .33 
and p = .66 is symmetrically reflected at an x-axis at y = .5. 
Figure 5 does not show within group/run variation (Fig. 4) 
but rather the variation between the group/run means. It 
becomes apparent that this variation at least is clearly much 
lower for shadow agents than for (communicating) network 
agents, particularly for non-extreme levels of reliability (p = 
.33 and p = .66). Although the communication normally 
reduces within-group variance (Fig, 4), Figure 5 shows that 
it increases the variance between groups in different runs—
particularly if paired with belief-based updating.  
To compare just the means of means (purple lines) in the 
updating strategies over time, we also plotted beside each 
other in Figure 6 for each of the four reliability values. 
On this level of aggregation of means of mean beliefs, 
first show that they go in the correct direction as long as the 
reliability is p > .5, and in a negative direction with an anti-
reliable data p < .5. But it has previously been pointed out 
that, even though formally modelling anti-reliability, the 
Olsson’s Bayesian model of belief-based trust-update 
obviously does not address the problem of anti-reliability 
(the problem of the ‘Cartesian Demon’), at least not without 
any prior knowledge present in this epistemic system (Hahn 
et al., 2018, subm.). The graphs also show the symmetry of 
partially reliable and partially unreliable sources.  
Apart from this, if we exclude anti-reliable sources and 
only look at p = .66, .80, .90, both kinds of (non-
communicating) shadow agents clearly seem less resolved 
than the networking agents (and highly similar to each other 
with a small advantage for the updater even). Interestingly, 
for the communicating agents there is a pronounced cross-
over of graphs of updater and fixed-trust agent: At the 
beginning, the updater clearly is in advantage, then the 
fixed-trust agent catches up and overtakes the updater (the 
latter visibly only for p = .66). If we look back at Figure 4, it 
becomes apparent that the updating network-agent pays a 
price for quickly approaching a higher belief in true H 
(given one is on the right side of reliability).  
The price seems a higher number of runs where the mean 
belief does not approach 1, but seems to approach another 
attractor. This results from trust-updating stabilizing 
polarizations (cf. Fig. 3) where groups have opposed beliefs, 
by potentially turning counter-information into anti-reliable 
information in favor of one's own hypothesis. This occurs 
here not based on motivational concerns, but actually based 
on ‘neural’ belief-based updating of reliability alone. 
Moreover, it appears that although the shadow agents 
plausibly fare less well over time than the communicators, 
they will presumably at some point overtake the 
communicating agents. We have not simulated this up to 
now, but at least for the shadow fixed-trust agent this is 
theoretically clear. They are very slow due to not amplifying 
the signal--either by using information of other agents or 
their own beliefs to modify the reliability of sources. They 
only use the facts (with a predefined reliability), without 
 
Figure 5: For each of the four investigated levels of objective reliability (p = .33, .66, .80, .90) we see the results for the 
four kinds of agents (Network Updater, Network Shadow, Fixed-Trust Agent, Fixed-Trust Shadow) who obtained the same 
data. In each chart we see the 50 agents’ mean belief for 100 runs (red lines). Additionally, the purple lines show the runs’ 
mean of these agents’ mean beliefs. 
 
being trapped in any feedback loop. For a partially positive 
reliable source (for pobj > .5), a fixed-trust agent with psub = 
.66 will converge to P(H) = 1 in the long run. Given that 
network agents’, and particularly network updaters’, beliefs 
have stable attractors differing from 1, it follows that the 
isolated epistemic atom, will at least in the very long run 
outperform all refined others.  
 
Figure 6. Mean of mean beliefs for the four updating 
strategies and four starting (or fixed) trust values (p = .33, 
.66, .80, .90) over time (again with H always being true, and 
higher values thus displaying more accurate beliefs). 
General Discussion 
Whereas our previous findings stressed the surprising 
similarity of belief-based trust updaters to fixed-trust agents 
in single-agent simulations (Hahn, von Sydow, & Merdes, 
2018) and the positive role of communication (for most 
parameterizations) for average individual votes but not for 
majority votes (Hahn, Merdes, & von Sydow, 2019), the 
current findings aim to shed light on the temporal dynamics 
and suggest that communication as well as trust-updating 
(particularly if paired together) can have advantages in the 
short run but may pay for this by being disadvantaged in the 
long run. For instance, the most aggregated Figure 6 shows 
that if we look at the panel for reliability pobj = .66 a switch 
over time of the resulting belief of the four updating 
strategies, which here corresponds to their order to be close 
to the truth (here H is always set to 1). All agents began 
with the (underconfident) value of P(H=1) = .5. Then the 
order, say after 20 updating steps, was UpNe >> FiNe >> 
UpSh > FiSh, but in the long run it switched to FiSh > UpSh 
> FiNe > UpNe (cf. Figures 4 and 5).  This seems – at least 
for the parameters and topology investigated – to hold for 
pobj > .5. However, even here, for the subset of very high pobj 
values, the four strategies will not switch but only approach 
the same value 1, because no polarization takes place. For 
these pobj values, the beliefs of the Network Updaters all 
finally approach the true value of Psub(H = 1) = 1 as well, 
but also much more quickly than fixed-trust agents. 
Likewise, communication in the short run improves the 
confidence in a true hypothesis. However, the 
communicating (networkers) updaters’ advantage of a quick 
initial convergence to the true value (as apparent for pobj = 
.66) is only achieved by the price of polarization (Figures 4 
and 5) and hence no complete convergence (Figure 6).  
One may object that polarization need not be a 
disadvantage. In another research paradigm, using active 
sampling and an exploration exploitation trade-off, it has 
been convincingly shown that transient group diversity 
could keep up the diversity required to find underexplored 
optimal options (Zollman, 2007, 2010). However, the 
paradigm and parameters can matter (cf. Frey, & Šešelja, 
2018), and we are here concerned with a different obser-
vation paradigm. The observation paradigm treats the agents 
as more passive than the active sampling paradigm (and 
reminiscent rather of classical than of operant conditioning). 
Even in the studied observation paradigm, agents are not 
fully passive due to weighting of external evidence by 
internal trust. In any case, in the observation-paradigm the 
polarizations are here shown to be normally non-transient – 
at least when simulated in our simple one-proposition 
networks (Figure 4, Network Updater, Run 108; Figure 5, 
Network Updater, horizontal lines not approximating 1). 
To return to our main issue, polarizations here are non-
transient and negative. This is a major reason for the fixed-
trust agents’ improving in the long run. Additionally, 
communicating seems helpful particularly for network 
agents, but will be matched or outperformed in the long run 
by non-communicating shadow-agents.  
Although the analysis of the underlying dynamics and the 
switching result seems new and important for the 
observation paradigm, the interpretation of these results 
raises questions and requires further research. We in fact 
have not reached full consensus within our team on how to 
interpret the data. But this should not make them less 
interesting.  A crucial question is whether to be as close to 
the truth as possible is always an advantage and whether an 
advantage in the short term can outweigh the advantage of 
being correct in the long term. This raises some fundamental 
issues that would require a more thorough treatment; here 
we can only briefly point out and discuss some open issues.  
On the positive side, it seems prima facie that quickly 
achieving resolvedness can be an advantage if a belief in H 
gets high (say, with H being ‘a tiger is in the forest’, and H 
being true) and one quickly reaches a decision-threshold to 
retreat to safety as soon as possible.  
A first objection may be that such considerations leave 
the realm of pure epistemology and require some potentially 
controversial assumptions about the epistemic or 
psychological constitution of the agent or the utilities 
relevant to the agent’s decision making. This problem 
however, does not appear fundamental.  
Another set of objections may concern how to weight (a) 
the utility of groups reaching a high mean belief in the truth 
in the short term against the price of some groups’ going in 
the wrong direction in the long run; and (b) the non-
transient heterogeneity even within groups.  
There is a further fundamental problem of the advantages 
of achieving resolvedness quickly is that overconfidence 
seems never to be a good thing. This has at least two 
aspects: First, isn’t the advantage of a high probability, 
Psub(H=1), given Hobj = 1, outweighed by a low probability 
of this proposition if pobj is actually low? This raises an 
important issue, but one may perhaps counter that more 
sources are presumably reliable (pobj > .5) than anti-reliable 
(pobj < .5). Therefore a weighted average model that takes 
this into account would put more weight on panels p = .66 
and p = .33 (Fig. 6), and an advantage of the updater would 
remain.  A second aspect is that it is not clear why we 
should not use even more radical values than those 
suggested by the Bayesian model. Given that an agent does 
not know whether his/her sources are truly independent (as 
assumed, but usually violated in actual social networks), and 
if the agent has no model of the dependencies (as assumed 
here), the Bayesian model is a Bayesian heuristic at best. 
Although the last point remains, rebuttal is also possible 
here. Agents started underconfident (with Psub(H) = .5), and 
therefore the quick increase may be advantageous up to 
some point. We suggest simulating an ideal agent who 
obtains all information from all agents simultaneously as a 
comparison. 
A final problem is that our graphs with Hobj = 1 
implicitly used absolute-difference scores from the beliefs. 
However, the Brier score (squared difference) punishes 
variance and would here yield more problematic results for 
the short-term winners. 
For all of these reasons the interpretation of our results 
concerning convergence-speed seems less clear than the true  
findings. We hope this sets the stage for further 
investigations and discussions. But let us return to the ‘light 
at the end of the tunnel’: Given that communication and also 
belief-based trust-updating are both prima facie and 
empirically plausible (Collins et al., 2018), isn’t it also 
pragmatically justified to search for rational aspects of these 
mechanisms? Moreover, isn’t it possible that potential 
speed-of-convergence advantage of belief-based updating 
combined with communication can positively interact with 
the second advantages of prior knowledge? Further 
discussions of these fundamental issues falls outside the 
scope of this paper, but it seems clear that our results 
suggest further avenues of research on agent-based 
modelling of belief-based trust update. 
Summary and Conclusion   
Olsson has suggested a rational Bayesian model of 
sequential belief-based trust-update. Hahn et al., albeit 
partly having supported the model previously, have argued 
that it is a far from clear a priori that this is a rational model. 
Our simulations have shown that this belief-based updating 
led to partly devastating results. We here elaborated on the 
temporal dynamics of trust-updating and communication. In 
contrast to previous work, we here stressed the potentially 
remaining positive sides in reiterating some prior work on 
prior knowledge and, particularly, in showing that 
communicating updaters do seem to advantageous in more 
quickly arriving at more resolved beliefs. However, we also 
raised serious issues concerning the interpretation of these 
findings. Future avenues of research require further tests of 
boundary conditions of the dynamics and potential 
advantages of belief-based updating with prior knowledge 
(perhaps mixing belief-based and outcome-based updating). 
This work suggests more strongly than previous work that 
there may be ‘light at the end of the tunnel’ of negative 
findings on the normative status of belief-based trust-
updating. However, at present it is not fully clear whether 
the light indicates the end of the tunnel or merely another 
oncoming train. 
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